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THE NEW YORK CITY MODEL: ESSENTIALS
FOR EFFECTIVE CAMPAIGN FINANCE
REGULATION
Nicole A. Gordon*
In the interest of full disclosure, I think it should be made
known that Judge Trager bears some responsibility for the state of
campaign finance reform in New York City, as he was a member
of the New York City Charter Revision Commission when this
topic was under consideration. It is therefore a double pleasure for
me to be here today at the inaugural Public Policy Symposium
established in his name.
I. "WILL ANYTHING WORK?"
From my point of view, the title of this forum, "Will Anything
Work?" is somewhat ominous for two reasons. First, it probably
accurately reflects the general sense of helplessness that the public
feels in reaction to endless stories of scandal arising from the
influence of private money on politics. It is not exactly a secret that
the federal system has collapsed, and the daily barrage of revela-
tions has an almost numbing effect, leaving people with the feeling
that the situation is hopeless.'
Second, I think the title fails to convey the fact that there are
actual success stories in the field of campaign finance regulation.
" Executive Director, New York City Campaign Finance Board. A.B. 1974,
Barnard College; J.D. 1977, Columbia University School of Law. The views
expressed in this article are solely the views of the author.
' See, e.g., Francis X. Clines, Bipartisan Voter Rebellion Against Big Money
in Maine Is Expected to Succeed, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 1996, at A 10 (discussing
a Maine campaign finance regulation proposal and how national campaign
finance scandals created the greatest opposition to the reform arising from the
"seed of cynicism, that element of doubt in peoples' heads that the system is so
bad that we actually can't do anything to fix it").
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For example, there are approximately twenty jurisdictions around
the country that have some form of public financing of campaigns
and that, as far as I am aware, have not been the subject of
pervasive scandal.2 Today I would like to make you aware of the
success story of New York City and suggest some elements of that
success that might be imported into the national scene. I do not
want to imply that we in New York City have all the answers to
the public disgrace of this past presidential season, but I do think
that because scandal is newsworthy and "good news" is not, the
public has received a limited picture of the possibilities for
controlling campaign finances.
II. NEW YORK CITY'S CAMPAIGN FINANCE PROGRAM
Perhaps you will recall a series of scandals in New York City
in the late 1980s relating to the Parking Violations Bureau.3 One
result of those scandals was the suicide of Queens Borough
President Donald Manes.4 In response to public dismay at the state
2 Currently, twenty-three states provide some form of public financing for
candidates. See EDWARD D. FEIGENBAUM & JAMES A. PALMER, CAMPAIGN
FINANCE LAW 96: A SUMMARY OF STATE CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAWS WITH
QUICK REFERENCE CHARTS Chart 4 (listing states with special tax or public
financing provisions). These states include Alabama, Arizona, California, Florida,
Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio,
Rhode Island, Utah, Virginia, and Wisconsin. Id.
' In 1986, then United States Attorney Rudolph Giuliani was informed that
contractors collecting overdue parking fines for the New York City Parking
Violations Bureau were required to pay a five-percent kickback to the then
Queens Borough President Donald Manes. Gary Spencer, Top Court Refuses
Appeal of Suspension of Dowd, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 24, 1990, at 1. Those involved
in the scheme included former Deputy Director of the Parking Violations Bureau
Geoffrey G. Lindenauer, former Bronx Democratic leader Stanley M. Friedman,
and former City Transportation Administrator Michael J. Lazar. Arnold H.
Lubasch, U.S. Says Manes Instigated Bribery Plan At City Agency, N.Y. TIMES,
May 23, 1986, at B 1. See generally JACK NEWFIELD & WAYNE BARRETT, CITY
FOR SALE: ED KOCH AND THE BETRAYAL OF NEW YORK (1989).
4 Manes stabbed himself after the public became aware of bribery and
kickback schemes involving the New York City Parking Violations Bureau.
Joseph P. Fried, 1980's Graft and 1990's Change: For Players in Scandal, Life
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of the New York City political scene, Mayor Koch pressed for
various reforms beginning as early as 1986. Among these reforms
was New York City's pioneer Campaign Finance Act5 that, with
the support of Council Speaker Peter Vallone, passed the City
Council after considerable debate.6 Curiously, the scandals that
prompted passage of the Act were unrelated to the subject of
campaign finance. Nonetheless, as Shakespeare wrote, "sweet are
the uses of adversity."7 For its troubles, New York City ended up
with the most comprehensive and progressive campaign finance
reform program in the country at that time.
Appointed in 1988, the New York City Campaign Finance
Board (the "Board") struggled to establish itself and the Campaign
Finance Program (the "Program") in time for effective enforcement
in the 1989 citywide elections. In record time, the Board succeeded
in putting its operations in place, which included computerizing
campaign finance data and making that data available to the
public.8
Briefly, the Board has three mandates. First, it administers the
Campaign Finance Program itself, which covers candidates who run
for five local offices (mayor, public advocate, comptroller, borough
president, and city councilmember). 9 These candidates voluntarily
choose to join the Program, which requires them to limit contribu-
tions and expenditures and to provide detailed disclosure of their
campaign finances. After the information is received, it is then
computerized and audited by the Board.' In return for joining the
Program and submitting to its requirements, these "participating"
is Far From the Same, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 1996, at B1.
I N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE §§ 3-701 to 3-715 (the "Campaign Finance Act")
(N.Y. Legal Pub. Group 1996 & Supp. 1997).
6 The Campaign Finance Act is intended "to improve popular understanding
of local issues, to increase participation in local elections by voters and
candidates, to reduce improper influence on local officers by large campaign
contributors and to enhance public confidence in local government." Local Law
No. 8 of 1988 § 1 (uncodified sections) (on file with Journal of Law and
Policy).
7 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, As You LIKE IT act 2, sc. 1.
s N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 3-708(9).
9 Id. § 3-703(l)(b).
10 Id. §§ 3-708(9), 3-710.
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candidates can qualify to receive matching public funds for
contributions they have received, after they establish sufficient local
support from New York City residents."
Second, as a result of a Charter Revision in 1988, the Board
publishes a Voter Guide, which is mailed to every registered voter
in New York City. The Guide includes photographs and statements
provided by candidates for office, whether or not they have joined
the Program. It also contains general voting information, as well as
ballot information and "pro" and "con" statements for local
initiatives. 2
Finally, an additional mandate was recently given to the Board,
to implement a requirement that citywide candidates who join the
Program participate in debates. 13
III. THE EFFECTS OF THE PROGRAM
After each election, the Board holds hearings and conducts
analyses of its extensive database in order to evaluate how the
Program worked during that election and to make recommendations
for improvements in the Program. The Campaign Finance Board's
studies have shown that the Program has demonstrably lowered the
average size of contributions, increased the number of individuals
contributing to campaigns, limited spending, evened the playing
field among the competitive candidates, and given some candidates
an opportunity to run an effective campaign despite the fact that
they did not have access to monied sources. "4 Some candidates in
" New York City matches every dollar, up to $1,000, raised by a candidate
from each New York City resident, subject to a maximum amount in public
funds available for the office sought. Id. § 3-702(3).
12 N.Y.C. CHARTER §§ 1052(b), 1053 (N.Y. Legal Pub. Group 1990 &
Supp. 1997).
'3 Local Law No. 90 of 1996.
'4 For details of the Board's findings, see NEW YORK CITY CAMPAIGN
FINANCE BOARD, ON THE ROAD TO REFORM: CAMPAIGN FINANCE IN THE 1993
NEW YORK CITY ELECTIONS (Sept. 1994); WINDOWS OF OPPORTUNITY:
CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM AND THE NEW CITY COUNCIL (July 1992);
DOLLARS AND DISCLOSURE: CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM IN NEW YORK CITY
(Sept. 1990).
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this latter category have even won elections. 15 The last two
mayoral campaigns have been the most competitive in memory, in
part because of the existence of the Program. As a result of the
Program, an unprecedented amount of information about candi-
dates' campaign finances has been made available to the public and
the press, including information about contributors' employers and
occupations and information on intermediaries or "bundlers."' 6
For the first time, every voter in New York City has had a non-
partisan source of information, the Voter Guide, that presents each
candidate for municipal office on an equal footing.
I do not, however, want to gloss over the shortcomings of the
Program. It has not solved, and it will never solve, all the ills that
arise from the influence of private money on campaigns. It has
been less successful at the City Council level than at the mayoral
level. Other than to require disclosure of "bundling," which is a
significant achievement, the Program does not address the influence
that is potentially wielded by intermediaries who deliver large
contributions on behalf of others.' 7 The Program has not elimi-
nated the difficulty of regulating campaign finances in an arena that
includes constitutionally protected independent spending. 18 Yet, all
in all, the Program has greatly reduced the role of large contribu-
tions in New York City races and, I believe, has itself greatly
improved the local political culture.
'5 See, e.g., Testimony of Council Member-Elect Guillermo Linares Before
the New York City Campaign Finance Board, Dec. 11, 1991 (on file with
Journal of Law and Policy) (explaining that, because of the Campaign Finance
Program, Mr. Linares was able to run a successful campaign for city council
against well-financed opponents including one person backed by a PAC, another
by a Manhattan County organization, and a third who was independently
wealthy).
6 A "bundler" is a person or entity that collects contributions from others
and delivers these "bundled" contributions to a candidate. The New York City
Administrative Code employs the term "intermediary." N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE
§ 3-702(12).
'7 See NEW YORK CITY CAMPAIGN FINANCE BOARD, BUNDLES OF
TROUBLE?: A REPORT OF THE NEW YORK CITY CAMPAIGN FINANCE BOARD
(1996).
"S See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (holding that independent
campaign spending is protected by the First Amendment right to free speech).
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IV NECESSARY CONDITIONS FOR SUCCESSFUL CAMPAIGN
FINANCE REFORM
Based on the Board's experience, I would identify the following
conditions as necessary for successful campaign finance reform:
A. A Non-Partisan Enforcement Agency
Unlike many other regulatory agencies in the country, the New
York City Campaign Finance Board is non-partisan. 9 Other
agencies that regulate campaign finances are bi-partisan, including
the Federal Election Commission .20 This fundamental distinction
has made the difference between an agency that is simply a product
of the existing political culture and an agency that can influence
that culture. The non-partisan approach of the Campaign Finance
Board is not only mandated by law, but it is also a fact of the life
of the Board. This is a result of the consistent excellence of the
appointments made to the Board and the dedication of its members
throughout the Board's existence.2'
The original members took their non-partisan charge seriously,
and so has every member appointed to the Board to date. It is this
'9 See N.Y.C. CHARTER § 1057 (requiring that the Board operate in a non-
partisan manner).
20 See 2 U.S.C. § 437c(a)(1) (1997) (requiring that of the six Presidential
appointments to the eight member Federal Election Commission, no more than
three may be from the same political party).
21 The original members of the Board included Joseph A. O'Hare, S.J.
(President, Fordham University), James I. Lewis (Professor of History, City
University of New York), Frank J. Macchiarola (current President, St. Francis
College, former Chancellor of the New York City School System), Robert B.
McKay (former Dean, New York University Law School), and Sonia Sotomayor
(current District Court Judge for the Southern District of New York). The current
members of the Board include Joseph A. O'Hare, S.J. (President, Fordham
University), Martin S. Begun (Assoc. Dean & Vice President for External
Affairs, New York University School of Medicine), Bill Green (former
Congressman), James I. Lewis (Professor of History, City University of New
York), and Vaughn C. Williams (Partner, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher &
Flom).
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non-partisan approach that allowed the Board to take the serious
step of assessing a $320,000 penalty against the campaign of an
incumbent mayor in 1993 during the height of a highly competitive
campaign.22 Because of the vagaries of Board turnover, it so
happened at the time that the Board did not include a single
Republican member, and yet it assessed this penalty against the
Democratic nominee for Mayor.23
B. Meaningful Enforcement Powers
Without proper enforcement powers, no agency in this field can
operate effectively. The New York City Campaign Finance Board
has the power to conduct audits, 4 and it in fact audits every
candidate in the Program. The Board can also issue subpoenas,
conduct investigations, depose witnesses,25 and bring civil enforce-
ment actions.26 The Board withholds public funds from candidates
who are not in compliance with the requirements of the Program.
In contrast, other agencies lack such enforcement powers. The
Federal Election Commission, for example, does not have the
power to perform random audits.27 I strongly believe that this fact
22 David N. Dinkins' mayoral campaign was assessed the penalty because
the campaign exceededthe spending limit for the 1993 Democratic Primary. See
New York City Campaign Finance Board, Preliminary Determination: Matter of
David N. Dinkins 1993 Primary Election Expenditures, ADMIN. PROC. No.
1993-9 (Oct. 3, 1993) (on file with Journal of Law and Policy).
23 The five members of the Board serve staggered, five-year terms. The
Mayor appoints two members who must be from different political parties, the
City Council Speaker similarly appoints two members, and the Mayor, after
consultation with the City Council Speaker, appoints the Chair, who may be from
any political party. See N.Y.C. CHARTER § 1052(a)(1); N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE
§ 3-708(1). At the time the penalty was assessed, the Board included three
Democrats and one Liberal. There was one vacant seat.
24 See N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 3-710(1) (the Board has the power "to audit
and examine all matters relating to the performance of its functions").
2 See N.Y.C. CHARTER § 1052 (a)(5) (providing for broad investigatory
powers); N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 3-708(5) (same).
26 N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 3-711 (describing civil and criminal penalties
available for violations of the Act).
27 See 2 U.S.C. § 438(b) (1997) (stating that the Federal Election Commis-
sion possesses the power to "conduct audits and field investigations of any
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alone raises serious questions about the reliability of the disclosure
that is made to the Federal Election Commission. Without adequate
enforcement powers, regulatory agencies are unable to ensure that
candidates are in compliance with campaign finance laws.
C. Aggressive Enforcement Policy
Meaningful enforcement for many aspects of campaign finance
reform must take place during the campaign season. If the Board
did not take action during the campaign against certain kinds of
potential violations, the public might not receive accurate and
timely disclosure. (The New York City Campaign Finance Board
does not seek a role in the electoral process, except to ensure that
the requirements of the Campaign Finance Act are respected. The
fact that the Board does take enforcement action during the
campaign period often, however, leads to the inclusion of compli-
ance issues in the political debate.) Furthermore, penalties for
substantial violations of the Act may otherwise come too late to
ensure the integrity of the election process. The Board is charged
to publicize violations of the Act,28 and, indeed, media attention
to violations is a far more potent deterrent than any monetary
penalty the Board might assess. Again, the Federal Election
Commission does not take enforcement action during a campaign.
This hampers its ability to be effective.
After an election, it is also important to follow through on the
full audit process. One of the strongest enforcement messages sent
to candidates in New York City was the recent set of indictments
of transit police union officials, which received a great deal of
press attention."z A routine post-election audit of the 1993 cam-
paign of Ron Reale, who ran for municipal office while he was
political committee required to file a report" under the terms of the Act only
when the committee in question has failed to meet certain threshold requirements
established by the Commission).
28 See N.Y.C. CHARTER § 1052 (a)(6); N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 3-708(6).
29 See, e.g., Matthew Purdy, Grand Jury Seeks Financial Records from
Police Union, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 1997, at A3 (describing racketeering charges
brought against transit police union officials and lawyers accused of paying
kickbacks to union officials).
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President of the Transit Police Benevolent Association, brought to
light irregularities that the Board referred to the United States
Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York.30 Some
of the resulting indictments relate directly to the information on
campaign finance matters provided by the Board.3' The remaining
indictments, which are unrelated to campaign finances, arose in
large part from the follow-up investigation conducted by the United
States Attorney's Office on the Board's campaign finance informa-
tion.
D. A Comprehensive Program of Reform
In order for meaningful reform to take place, it must be
comprehensive. Every element of the New York City Campaign
Finance Program contributes to its success. For example, the
prospect of receiving public funds is a tremendous incentive for
campaigns to comply with disclosure and other requirements of the
Program-an incentive more powerful, I am sure, than the
disincentive of possible penalties.
E. Operational Integrity
The Campaign Finance Board does everything it can to run an
efficient office and to provide good service to its clients, the voters
of the City of New York and municipal candidates. For example,
the Board has developed possibly the most comprehensive
computerization program for campaign finance data in the nation.
30 Kevin Flynn & William K. Rashbaum, Following Money Trail, DAILY
NEWS, Feb. 3, 1997, at 4 (discussing Ron Reale's campaign finance violations
and his involvement with organized crime).
3" See Clifford J. Levy, Finance Data Raised Doubts of City Board, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 26, 1997, at A5 (discussing the Campaign Finance Board's finding
that 54 money orders made out to "Friends of Ron Reale" were "signed by
different people, but many were sequentially numbered and issued on the same
days by the same banks"); Board's Audit of Ron Reale Uncovers Serious
Campaign Finance Violations, 3 CITYLAW 16 (1997) (discussing Campaign
Finance Board's audit and United States Attorney Mary Jo White's investigation
of Ron Reale).
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The Board provides software to the candidates so that they can file
disclosure statements with the agency on disk. The Board also
provides access to a public computer terminal that anyone (even
without computer expertise) can use to study current contribution
data.32 The staff's commitment to operational excellence and
fairness has been essential to the success of the Program.
F Support of the Press and the Public
The New York City Campaign Finance Board has enjoyed
extraordinary support from the press, government groups, and,
indirectly, the public. This has had several effects. First, it has
strongly influenced candidates to join the Program, when, in reality,
many might prefer not to operate under its constraints. Second, it
has driven candidates who declined to abide by government reforms
out of the running.33 Third, it has driven candidates to comply
with the spirit, as well as with the letter, of the law.34
Press and public support have also helped to maintain the
Campaign Finance Board as a truly non-partisan Board. In 1993,
outgoing Mayor Dinkins replaced the Board's Chairman, who was
serving past his term, in what many perceived as retaliation for the
32 The Campaign Finance Board maintains computer records in a "user-
friendly environment" for easy public access and study. Jodi Ackerman,
Computers Wanted for Election Records, GANNETT NEWS SERVICE, Mar. 11,
1996, available in 1996 WL 4375844.
3' For example, in 1993, mayoral candidate Andy Stein was forced to
withdraw from the race, largely because of criticism of his lavish fundraising and
spending. See Maurice Carroll & Mitch Gelman, Andy Stein to Start from
Scratch, N.Y. NEWSDAY, June 3, 1993, at 3 (noting that Stein cited the
"public['s] distaste" for his fundraising excesses to explain the failure of his
campaign and that, in a subsequent campaign for the office of public advocate,
Stein planned to follow city laws limiting campaign contributions and spending).
"' For example, prior to any Board action, the campaign of mayoral
candidate David Dinkins decided to absorb expenditures made by the Democratic
Party that the campaign and the party had argued should be considered
"independent" and not attributable to the campaign's spending limit. See William
Bunch, Dinkins Will Pay It Back, N.Y. NEWSDAY, Oct. 20, 1993, at 7 (stating
that the Dinkins campaign paid back $226,031 to the Democratic Committee just
twenty-four hours before the Campaign Finance Board was to rule on the
campaign's claim that the expenditures should not be charged to the campaign).
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Board's assessment of a large penalty against his campaign.35 In
what may be an unprecedented event in New York City history, the
Chairman of the Board, Father Joseph A. O'Hare, S.J., President of
Fordham University, was reappointed after public outcry forced the
new Chairman to resign.36 The lesson of that incident should be
clear: worthy, prompt appointments are essential to the integrity of
New York City's Program.
Finally, press and public support have helped protect the
Campaign Finance Board from possible efforts to dilute its
effectiveness through budget cuts or retrogressive changes in the
law. The Campaign Finance Board relies significantly on its public
reputation to maintain its effectiveness in these respects.
G. Continual Refinement of the Program
A vital aspect of the New York City Program is a mandate for
the Board to review the operation of the Program after each
election (every four years) and to report to the Mayor and the City
Council with recommendations for change.37 The reality is that
any reform will have loopholes, and campaigns will "push the
envelope" in their pursuit of success. Laws and regulations must be
continually refined to anticipate ways in which candidates may
subvert the purpose of reform and to address ways in which
campaigns have learned to evade the system. In New York City, we
have seen several aspects of our local law strengthened, often at the
3 See supra note 22 and accompanying text. The Campaign Finance Act
provides that Board members may not be dismissed "except for cause and upon
notice and hearing." See N.Y.C. CHARTER § 1052(4); N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE
§ 3-708(4). Chairman O'Hare's term had expired in March 1993, and Mayor
Dinkins had neither re-appointed Chairman O'Hare nor appointed a successor as
of the end of December 1993. The Chairman was therefore continuing to serve
as a holdover, as contemplated by the N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 5 (McKinney
1988). Had appointments been made in a timely manner, it would not have been
possible for the Mayor to replace a sitting Board member.
36 See Maurice Carroll, Campaign Finance Chief Un-Fired, N.Y. NEWSDAY,
Jan. 11, 1994, at 16 (crediting Giuliani with mobilizing the public outcry, but
noting that, upon reappointment, O'Hare promptly promised to investigate the
Giuliani campaign for alleged violations of the Campaign Finance Act).
17 N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 3-713.
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Board's urging.38 More recently, the Board has recommended a
number of additional changes that have not been acted upon. The
Board is, however, continuing to press for these changes both at the
State and City levels.
At the State level, the Board seeks legislation that would
require non-participating candidates to abide by the City Campaign
Finance Act disclosure requirements and contribution limits. If all
candidates were subject to the Campaign Finance Act's require-
ments, the public could compare the same computerized informa-
tion for candidates running for the same offices. In addition, equal
contribution limits would further reduce the influence of large
monied interests and would further "level the playing field."
At the City level, the Board urges a number of reforms that are
intended, among other things, to enhance the value of public
matching funds, to create greater incentives for candidates to join
the Program, and to give candidates in the Program greater
protection against high-spending non-participants.39
CONCLUSION
I believe that New York City's reform, while successful, might
in the long run prove fragile. It is grounded in good law, but that
law must be revised continually for the better. Fortunately, the
Campaign Finance Act has been administered by a committed and
highly competent Board. Appointing authorities could, however,
select members in the future who are less committed to the
purposes of the law. The Program has been successful in three
citywide elections, but without constant reinforcement through
legislative change, that success may fade. For continued success,
we must rely heavily on the good faith of many players in the
political scene. Finally, as a bellwether, the Program has created a
hopeful point of reference, but public cynicism can overwhelm all
good will and good work.
The focus of the national press on shortcomings of the federal
system is necessary and useful, but it fails to alert the public to the
" See ON THE ROAD TO REFORM, VOL. I, supra note 14, at 129.
'9 See ON THE ROAD TO REFORM, VOL. I, supra note 14, at 121-32.
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lesser drama of success stories, of which New York City is only
one. This is a source of continuing frustration for the Campaign
Finance Board, and I think it is also a disservice to our disillu-
sioned electorate.
More recently, however, efforts are being made around the
country to address the urgent need to repair our democratic process.
For the first time, the academic community is engaged in a
significant discussion of campaign finance reform, not only with
reference to the First Amendment, but also with reference to our
society's commitment to the principle of "one person, one vote" in
a meaningfully representative government. 40 Foundations are
funding efforts to address campaign finance reform, and this
conference is itself evidence that there exist constituencies
interested not only in scandals, but in identifying concrete ways to
safeguard our democracy.
I take this conference as an investment in a positive answer to
the question "Will Anything Work?" I hope I have conveyed to you
that some reforms are working, and I hope you will be part of an
effort to convey to the public that the situation, even at the federal
level, is not hopeless.
40 Jamin Raskin & John Bonifaz, The Constitutional Imperative and
Practical Superiority of Democratically Financed Elections, 94 COLUM. L. REV.
1160 (1994); Jamin Raskin & John Bonifaz, Equal Protection and the Wealth
Primary, 11 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 273 (1993).

